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SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL ACTION
Bernard J. Coughlin
Gonzaga University
Spokane, Washington
and
S. K. Khinduka
Washington University
Saint Louis, Missouri

We define social action as a strategy to obtain limited social change at the
intermediate or macro levels of society which is generally used in nonconsensus
situations and employs both "norm-adhering" and "norm-testing" modes of intervention.1
In this formulation, the key concept is social change. This paper proposes to explore certain aspects of social change as they apply to social action.
Thd discussion is divided into two parts. The first is a brief summary of pertinent social change theory, presented as background for part two in which are presented and discussed certain propositions about planned change that are critical to
any social action endeavor. This treatment, obviously, will not cover every subconcept of social change that is applicable to social action. Nor does it include
a direct discussion of power, crucial as this is for social action; that requires a
separate treatment of its own. Only five concepts are selected and discussed:
social movements, crisis, conflict, resistance to change, and legitimacy.
Social Change
Implicit in the above definition is the idea that social action is a strategy
neither for revolutionary change nor for altering the behavior of individuals and
small groups. Rather, it is for change in that interstitial area which goes beyond
the daily modifications of interpersonal and small group behavior, but stops short of
fundamental and radical transformations in the social structure. The purpose of social action is not to effect changes in the personality system or in the routine administration and management of formal organizations, but in the programs and policies
of organizations and institutions. Moreover, social action directs itself to changes
within social systems rather than changes of social systems themselves. "Change
within the system refers to change that does not alter the system's basic structure
*.'.* Change of the system is any change that alters the system's basic structure." 2 In this-sense social action is liberal, rather than what Boguslaw calls
radical social action.1
Change through social action differs from other forms of change. Being purposive change, it is distinct from natural or accidental change even though the latter
also may have social and political consequences. It is a strategy of planned change,
not a spontaneous, unpremeditated or accidental intervention in societal processes.
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It likewise differs from those changes that occur as a result of cumulative innovations in technology, ecological and demographic shifts, urbanization, industrialization, and modernization. Furthermore, it differs from such
4 other methods of
planned change as social planning and community development.
The aim of social action is not per ase and directly to change people's values
and attitudes, however important this may be for lasting change, but to modify the
policies and priorities of social, economic and political institutions. In this
sense, it is social action, and not cultural or psychological action, although,
except for analytical purposes, such a distinction is sometimes hard to maintain.
The nature of social change is greatly disputed. Equilibrium theories, conflict theories, evolutionary theories, and rise and fall theories seek to explain social change in their own particular terms. That there is a lack of consensus on the
definition is understandable, given the many variables that must be embraced: change
is wrought by natural forces as well as by human effort; it is both adaptive and
maladaptive for the society, or adaptive for some parts of the society and maladaptive for others; there is large scale and small scale change; its pace is rapid or
slow; its time span short or long; here it is ephemeral, there of lasting duration;
it may be marked by a continuity or a discontinuity in the societal process; it may
affect only one or many parts of the social system simultaneously.
Depending on their purpose, background, available data, predilections and
selection from among this range of variables, theorists have stressed the influence
of legal or economic forces, science and technology, demography, values and value
conflicts, idealogy, leadership, political forces, urbanization and industrialization,
education, mass media, conflict, social movements or social planning as key causes of
social change. Today, therefore, most sociologists hold that a variety of factors
cause, expedite, impede, and prevent change. The appeal of grand theorists and
classical explanations notwithstanding "there is no reason to suppose that all knowledge that would ever excite human interest can be included in one single, simple
'5
law."
Unlike the law of gravity, as far as we now know, there is no one law of social change.
Subscribing to a multifactor explanation of social change, however, forces us
to face the humbling fact that our present knowledge consists, to a considerable degree, in classifying and interrelating the many variables that affect the course of
change. It means that it is impossible to give a rule of thumb as to how to effect
change. As there is no single, usable theory of social change, the best that can
be done at this stage in the development of the art is to offer certain propositions,
the understanding of which is, one hopes, useful to the social actionist. This is
what we will attempt.
Social Movement
The first proposition concerns the close relationship between social action and
social movements. Many phenomena characteristic of social movements are also characteristic of social action, and the goals of the latter frequently consciously con-
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tribute to the goals of the former. It is perhaps because social action and social
movements have so many similarities that social actionists often find themselves
supporting social movements. Insight into the genesis, sources, types, idealogical
foundations, organizational structure, and the career of social movements is thus
valuable for the social actionist, for social movements are social action writ large.
Social movements are "socially shared demands for change in some aspects of the
social order."'6 They are based on the assumption that collective action can be more
effective than the isolated activities of individuals. They depend on a group's
shared values and objectives, and grow strong on generalized beliefs that challenge
extant ideologies and institutions. Participants in social movements are thrown
together in a common cause and a sense of membership in a group that usually develops
its own structure and a division of labor between leaders and followers. 7 They
largely come from those groups who are dissatisfied with at least part of the dominant
social order, and who challenge the legitimacy of prevailing values and institutions.
They precipitate public controversy, crystallize issues, and at times polarize the
citizenry. To be successful they must not simply reject existing values and institutions but propose a counter
ideology and vision of how certain aspects of the society
8

should be reorganized.

Social movements, thus, serve many social purposes: they force a crystallization of public opinion and promote a sense of solidarity among participants; they
heighten the personal stake of citizens in the commonweal and provide a training
ground in organizational leadership; when successful, they result in an accommodation
between the demands of the participants and the rule systems of major social institutions. And even when they fail, they fulfill a broad educative function 9 and inject
into the society at large the idealogies and beliefs that fathered them.
Crisis
The second proposition concerns the role of crisis in social change. Although
not always a necessary or sufficient condition, crisis often creates the demand for
and facilitates the acceptance of change. The function of crisis in inducing change
has received considerable attention in the literature. And this throws us into
another sociological controversy. There is no unanimity among students of the subject
as to whether the sources of change lie within the structure or are entirely extrinsic
to it.
We think there is evidence to support the view of Parsons that "the potential ''
sources of structural change are exogenous and endogenous -- usually in combination.

0

Whether its originating conditions are internal or external, change is often preceded and accompanied by a situation of crisis and tension. In its simplest sense,
crisis is a condition in which the human being, roup or organization is no longer
able to continue its accustomed way of behavior.1 I Crises are interruptions of
habitual ways, occasioning a loss of control. They demand that individual and group
attention be aroused to meet an unusual situation. Agony in crises lies in this, that
they demand full consciousness and attention to an event that threatens to sweep away
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the habitual ways we have for maintaining control over ourselves and the things
around us. For this reason, during periods of crisis a group more readily accepts
change and the intervention of a change agent who proposes to reduce the agonizing,
to direct to new goals, to establish new programs and priorities, and to regularize
life again.
Consistent with his theory of change, Nisbet insists that crises are always
preceded and precipitated by a historical event which is invariably external to the
12
social structure itself.
Moore, on the other hand, argues that tensions or strains
3
are often the "probable sites of change."1
Both views may be valid. We suggest that
what is important to recognize is that tensions and crises are fertile soil for social
change whether they originate internally or externally to the social system in question.
In suggesting a correlation between crises and social change we are not implying
a causal connection, but simply that crises do tend to generate conditions that are
sufficiently discomforting as to precipitate change. It is the probability of a crisis situation inducing change that led recent strategists of social action to create
conditions in which business as usual could not proceed. Norm-testing change tactics 1 4
such as disruptive demonstrations rest on the likelihood that they will create crisis.
It must be remembered, however, that resolving the crisis through change will not
necessarily restore an equilibrium; change itself will almost certainly produce
new
15
crises and tensions just as it may have reduced past crises and tensions.
Conflict
The third proposition is that significant social change, involving as it invariably does a redistribution of power and privilege, rarely avoids conflict. "A con'1 6
flict exists whenever incompatible activities occur."
It arises from many sources:
from scarcity of resources like money and status, or differences in information, beliefs, goals and values, or from different desires, interests, perceptions and priorities. Dahrendorf accounts for conflict ultimately in the authority relationships that
obtain in every social structure. "The structural origin of such group conflicts must
be sought in the arrangement of social roles endowed with expectations of domination
or subjection. Wherever there are such roles, group conflicts. . . are to be ex7
pected."1
Social action usually seeks to realign that arrangement of social roles
and scarce resources. When the action is contested and opposed, as it frequently is,
the issue is joined and conflict ensures.
Conflict as a strategy does not invariably lead to the intended change. Coser's
distinction between realistic and nonrealistic conflict is well known. Conflict may
be so vague, meaningless and unlocalized, and so nonrealistic, as to be dysfunctional.
Nonrealistic conflict is pursued, not as a rational means to achieve a change goal or
as part of a planned strategy, but simply as a release of aggressive tension, and so
18
is pursued as an end in itself.
Deutsch makes a distinction between constructive and destructive conflict.
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1 9

Constructive conflict is not unreigned, but teleologically controlled. Destructive
conflict has a tendency to escalate indiscriminately. Its consequences are difficult to predict, it courses beyond control, losing connection with its original purpose, it expands in numerous dimensions. The initial goal is displaced, the process of scapegoating let loose. A Gresham's Law of Conflict comes into play in
which harmful and dangerous elements drive out those forces that seek to keep conflict within reasonable bounds. 20 So called "absolute conflict" in which the end
is the annihilation of the opponent rather than a mutually agreed upon settlement,
is rarely, if ever, functional. Enduring conflicts of this kind are excessively
costly for society and not the business of social action. If conflict is deemed
necessary, cessation of conflict through a resolution and agreement by both parties
is equally necessary. 2 1 In employing conflict as a planned strategy, therefore, the
social actionist should incorporate as part of the plan some concept of its settlement and constructive resolution, and this will usually, if not invariably, be through
some form of compromise between the parties in conflict.
When used as a means to a known and attainable goal, conflict can be both function
al and constructive. To use conflict in this way the social actionist must be able to
pinpoint the issues that divide so that the boundaries of the fight can be clearly
established; he must also recognize and clarify the basic areas of interdependence
between the contending parties. Conflict is essentially an interactional process
between parties who are interdependent. They need one another. Their interdependence
defines, as it were, the ground rules for the contest; it enables the parties to become polarized over the precise issues and to stake out their positions without introducing goals, means or issues that are destructive; and it permits them to test one
another and engage in a struggle with reasonable assurance that the entire social
system in question will not fall apart.
In fact, the social system may, as a result of the conflict achieve a higher
unity. Constructive conflict rationally pursued presupposes that the contending parties have accepted some rules governing their relationship and their hostilities. Out
of the conflict can come a new set of norms governing their relationship and the society at large. As Coser observes, "By bringing about new situations, which are
partly or totally undefined by rules and norms, conflict acts as a stimulus for the
establishment of new rules and norms." 2 2 This form of conflict can be socially constructive, offering the prospect, once it is resolved, of a closer and more meaningful
bond between the conflicting parties.
Resistance to Change
The fourth proposition concerns the factor of resistance to change. Whenever
social action pursues a course of significant social change, resistance to the change
will be encountered, and must be contended with. Significant social change is invariably met with hesitation, ridicule, suspicion and rejection from powerful groups in the
society. This is expected since social change of any consequence adversely affects
the life situation of some groups. 2 3 Resistance is behavior to prevent change or to
protect an individual from the effects of change. The effects may be real or imaginary. 2 4 Mechanisms of resistance exist both within the personality and the social
system. The social system resists change, using such mechanisms as:
(1) conformity
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to norms, social norms performing for the social system the same resistance function
that habits perform for the individual; (2) systemic and cultural coherence, the
attitude that, since all the parts of the system are interdependent and attempts to
change one part may have unforeseen detrimental side-effects, all innovations, therefore, should be resisted; and (3) rejection of outsiders, who are suspect of having
different values and norms and so their proposals for change are not seen compatible
with the social and cultural system in question. 2 5 In general, as Allen summarizes,
social systems tend to resist innovations which interfere with their basic needs of
pattern maintenance and tension-management, adaptation, goal attainment and integration.26
Resistance is stiffest among the vested interests, as they were dubbed by
Veblen. 2 7 The vested interests are fundamentally concerned with retaining the
existing pattern of rewards and sanctions which are embedded in the established system of role expectations. These rewards and sanctions with their consequent gratifications for the vested interests may be in the political, economic or social realms.
According to Parsons, the phenomenon of vested interests pervades all social change,
change being possible only by overcoming the resistance of vested interests. "It is,
therefore," he says, "always essential explicitly to analyze the structure of the
relevant vested interest complex before coming to any judgment of the probable out28
come of the incidence of forces making for change."
Equally pervasive and perhaps even more deeply entrenched are the guardians of
traditional and, especially, sacred values and group ideals. 29 It is, therefore,
crucial to know and gauge a society's commitment to moral precepts and sacred beliefs
as well as to organizational patterns. As Ryan says, "Innovations are generally
tested against this 'moral order,' to assess their consistency or inconsistency and
their supportive or destructive consequences for these aspects of life which are held
dear and inviolable." 30 This testing of innovations against accepted social norms is
applicable to the secular as well as the sacrosanct; no change in any social unit
escapes it.
Failure to recognize the stubborn persistence of cultural and organizational
norms handicaps from the start the change efforts of the social actionist. Nothing
perhaps is more important than that he clearly understand the norms of the organization and the value orientation of the social unit with which he is working. Otherwise he may find that he is totally unable to establish his authority with the change
target. For him, therefore, the following questions are crucial: what values does
the group hold most sacred? what norms and structures are most established and
guarded? what functions do they serve? why are they adhered to with such persistence? will they facilitate or obstruct the change-goals? who are the guardians of
the established norms?
It is worth noting that much of the literature on resistance to change comes
either from the field of psychotherapy, in which resistance serves as an ingredient
in the therapeutic process, or from the field or organizational and industrial psychology where the resistance of personnel is considered an obstacle to higher productivity and is thus sought to be reduced by educational and morale boosting efforts.
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Likewise, cultural anthropologists and rural sociologists have pointed out how people
in the developing countries have resisted technological innovation, as being in conflict with traditional values, and how mass educational programs have attempted to
persuade them to integrate modern technology into their traditional world views. Social actionists face a different kind of resistance than clinical therapists, organizational psychologists, and cultural anthropologists. They face such groups as the
economic and social elite, policy makers in public institutions and politicians that
represent many powerful interest groups. How to reduce the resistance of these groups,
when both the intended and perceived outcome of the effort is a redistribution of
power, is something on which less is conclusively known and more systematic information
is needed.
Legitimacy
A fifth proposition deals with one critical aspect of the concept of power, and
that is its legitimation. Since social action is a vigorous questioning of the
legitimacy of some aspect of the existing social order, the social actionist must
establish his own legitimacy as a change agent. To carry this through to its successful termination in new change goals, he must establish his legitimacy with two groups:
the underprivileged on whose behalf he seeks more power and resources, and the change
target from whom he seeks to wrest some power and privilege. The underprivileged,
although they may have most to gain by change, generally also stand the most to lose.
The condition of most underprivileged could be worse as well as better, so that Marx's
cry "you have nothing to lose but your chains" is not adequate to create a following
and evoke a mandate to lead. The underprivileged more than others have been duped by
high pressure salesmen selling the London Bridge. They are not without mistrust of
medicine men who walk out of the middle class with their utopian wares. The underprivileged want bread and butter on the table now, which utopias seldom promise and
rarely deliver. What can the social actionist really and surely deliver? His hopes
for gaining legitimacy with the underprivileged rest on his response to that question.
As for the change target, on whatever base the social actionist chooses to rest
his claim to introduce change--tradition, rationality, charisma, or some combination
thereof--he cannot effectively challenge those in positions of power without having
legitimated his own role as a change agent. As indicated above, a group reserves its
most stubborn resistance to those changes that are perceived to be incompatible with
the traditional order and value system, and which seem to violate the most cherished
and "sacred" cultural norms. A change agent must establish the compatibility of his
goals with the larger value system of the group. Therefore, he must not only specify
what he wants in terms of an action goal, but also clearly state the basis on which
he rests his authority to change the established order in moving toward that goal. He
needs to be clear himself and to answer precisely the following questions: by what
authority does he act? what in him, in his program, and in his course of action, is
he asking them to legitimize? to what order of authority are they likely to respond:
traditional norms and customs, law and rationality, intellectual leadership and expertise, economic self interest?
Notwithstanding precise and clear answers to these questions, the social actionist may nevertheless expect that his questioning of existing norms will not go unre-
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buffed. 3 1 It is ironic that the rebuff is likely to come from both friends and
enemies. That shrewd observer of politics, Machiavelli, noted this more than 450
years ago in a passage on changing a state's constitution. His statement has equal
validity for any major change.
The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order,
and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under
the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries,
who have the existing laws on their side, and partly because men are
generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have
tested them by experience. In consequence, whenever those who oppose the
changes can do so, they attack vigorously, and the defense made by the
So both the innovator and his friends are endanothers is only lukewarm.
32
gered together.
Conclusion
While the literature on the subject of social action is not extensive, there is
a long history of articles and books that stretches back to the early decades of this
century. Most of these pieces are either exhortations to greater involvement or des- 3 3
criptive presentations of social action and the stages that it generally encompasses.
Only recently are serious attempts being made to study it conceptually and to relate
it to its social science moorings so that it may serve as a more reliable instrument
of planned change. This essay has attempted to contribute to this conceptual understanding. Techniques and tactics, and skill in using them, are obviously important
in social action, but tactical skill must be joined to understanding and judgment.
Effective planned change, ultimately, is a blend of intellectual analysis and skill
in action. As Weber said of politics, it is "made with the head, but it is certainly
not made with the head alone."'3 4 This paper has stressed the head, the importance of
intellectual analysis as a prerequisite to successful action. It points to the necessity of conceptually grasping the requently complex fabric in which social action occurs. That fabric includes, among other major components, social movements, crisis,
conflict, resistance and legitimacy.
One of Karl Marx's memorable dicta is: "Philosophers have interpreted the world;
the need however is to change it." Over a hundred years have passed, a review of which
makes us add to the Marxian dictum: the need is still to change the world, so let us
understand it.
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